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I   INTRODUCTION 
The September 11 attacks may have popularised the phrase ‘the war on 
terror’, but the international community has co-operated to address the threat of 
terrorism since at least 1937. In one of its aspects, co-operation has taken the 
form of a series of treaties requiring states to criminalise and suppress particular 
manifestations of transnational terrorism. This regime has developed in a 
piecemeal fashion, each treaty adopted in response to a specific act of ‘headline-
grabbing’ terrorism committed by non-state actors (‘NSAs’), and with a view to 
ensuring there is no impunity for such type of terrorist conduct in the future. The 
scope of the treaty regime has also been shaped by the rights of NSAs (in 
particular the rights of peoples) to self-determination. As a result, the terrorism 
suppression regime is somewhat unique in that the focus of the treaties (the 
particular manifestation of terrorism which each addresses) is driven by the 
conduct of NSAs. While states decided to create a treaty regime to address the 
criminal law enforcement challenges inherent in transnational terrorism, the 
‘terrorism suppression agenda’ was in fact set by the criminals themselves. 
The question examined in this article is: ‘To what extent can international 
law which “responds” to the conduct of NSAs be “responsive”?’ Put another 
way, as viewed through the particular prism of terrorism suppression, what are 
the potentialities and limitations of reactive law making? The answer to this 
question in the terrorism suppression context is heavily conditioned by the 
historical and political context within which the treaties were negotiated, not least 
because these treaties are at the crossroads of criminal responsibility for non-state 
conduct and the rights of peoples to self-determination. As a result, the 
conclusions regarding the potentialities and limitations of reactive law making 
may not be generalisable, but they certainly highlight features and issues that 
states negotiating reactive treaties in other contexts may want to avoid or 
emulate. 
This article will first sketch the development of international law related to 
terrorism suppression, starting with League of Nations and International Law 
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Commission (‘ILC’) efforts, and culminating in the now familiar pattern of an act 
of ‘headline-grabbing’ terrorism followed by the negotiation of a treaty 
addressing that particular manifestation of terrorism (often referred to as the 
‘sectoral approach’). This article will then explore the implications of this pattern 
of international law making, beginning with some of its potentialities in 
addressing the interaction between rights and criminal responsibility of NSAs, 
and concluding with its limitations in terms of the coherence of the treaty regime 
addressing terrorism, in particular as regards the principles of regime interaction 
to which the treaty regime gives effect.  
 
II   THE BIRTH OF THE SECTORAL APPROACH TO 
TERRORISM SUPPRESSION 
There are two distinct vantage points from which to view international law 
development vis-à-vis terrorism, each resting on the nature of the terrorist actor 
whose conduct is regulated. One view of terrorism considers the state as a 
potential terrorist actor. Given that a state’s active participation in international 
terrorism amounts to a threat to international peace and security, this form of 
terrorist conduct is addressed through the prism of the jus ad bellum – the state 
itself is the subject of the prohibition on state terrorism as an instantiation of the 
general prohibition on the use of force in international relations. The Charter of 
the United Nations is the springboard for related customary international law 
development in regard to state terrorism.1  
Terrorism, however, is also a tool of the dispossessed. Efforts to suppress 
international terrorism have therefore equally addressed threats emanating from 
the terrorist conduct of NSAs. In response to these threats, co-operation in the 
suppression of terrorism has taken the form of criminal law enforcement treaties 
that aim to secure individual responsibility.2 As and when terrorist actors began 
to use transnational violence in new ways, the international community 
responded to these developments through the adoption of a new terrorism 
suppression convention which addressed that particular manifestation of 
                                                 
1  See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res 2625 (XXV), UN GAOR, 
25th sess, 1883rd plen mtg, Agenda Item 85, Supp No 28, UN Doc A/RES/25/2625 (24 October 1970) 
(‘UN Declaration on Friendly Relations 1970’).  
2  Security Council ‘legislation’ has also been a source of criminal law enforcement obligations in respect of 
terrorism. See, eg, SC Res 1373, UN SCOR, 4385th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001). The 
legitimacy of the Security Council assuming the role of international legislature was hotly debated in the 
academic literature: see, eg, Paul C Szasz, ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’ (2002) 96 American 
Journal of International Law 901; Matthew Happold, ‘Security Council Resolution 1373 and the 
Constitution of the United Nations’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 593; Eric Rosand, 
‘Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism’ 
(2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 333; Stefan Talmon, ‘The Security Council as World 
Legislature’ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 175; but in practice, states have complied 
with at least the reporting obligations imposed on them pursuant to relevant resolutions. Given that the 
Security Council drew to a large extent on existing criminal law enforcement treaty obligations, this 
article will focus on law development through treaty negotiation. 
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terrorism. From this vantage point, international law development in respect of 
terrorism is driven principally by the activities of NSAs. This article examines 
terrorism suppression from this second vantage point.  
The first multilateral effort to suppress transnational terrorism was triggered 
by the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and Mr Louis Barthou, 
Foreign Minister of the French Republic, in Marseilles on 9 October 1934, by 
Yugoslav émigrés operating from Hungary. The matter was brought to the 
attention of the Council of the League of Nations – in particular, Yugoslavia 
accused Hungary of complicity in the terrorist activities of the assassins.3 The 
Council adopted a resolution (unanimously) in which it decided that ‘certain 
Hungarian authorities may have assumed, at any rate through negligence, certain 
responsibilities relative to acts having a connection with the preparation of the 
crime of Marseilles’.4 
Despite the allegations of state supported terrorism, the League of Nations 
did not limit itself to a condemnation of Hungarian conduct. It also established a 
committee to draft a treaty addressing crimes committed with political or terrorist 
purposes – with a view to ensuring there is no impunity for the physical actors 
committing such crimes (even if committing them on behalf of a state). 5  In 
particular, the treaty addressed some of the difficulties in bringing terrorists to 
justice resulting from their transnational existence and the limitations imposed by 
international law on the exercise of jurisdiction. These difficulties had been on 
the League’s agenda since at least 1926,6 and had been considered at a number of 
conferences for the unification of criminal law,7 but the assassination of King 
Alexander I was the catalyst – galvanising political will – for the adoption of the 
League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 
(‘League of Nations Terrorism Convention’) in 1937. 8  While the League of 
Nations Terrorism Convention is different in scope from its modern terrorism 
suppression siblings (as discussed further below), reactive law making was 
                                                 
3  League of Nations Council, ‘Third Meeting (Public): Held on Friday, December 7th, 1934, at 3pm’ (1934) 
15 League of Nations Official Journal 1712, 1713–14. See also Michel Liais, ‘L’affaire Hungaro-
Yougoslave devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations’ (1935) 42 Revue Générale de Droit 
International Public 127. 
4  League of Nations Council, ‘Sixth Meeting (Public): Held on Monday, December 10th, 1934, at 10.30pm’ 
(1934) 15 League of Nations Official Journal 1758, 1760. 
5  Committee for the International Repression of Terrorism, LN Doc CRT.1 (10 April 1935). 
6  Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, Report to the Council of the 
League of Nations on the Questions which Appear Ripe for International Regulation, 3rd sess, LN Doc 
C.196.M.70.1927.V (20 April 1927) annex II (‘Letter from Romania to Committee of Experts for the 
Progressive Codification of International Law, 20 November 1926’) 196, 221. 
7  Troisième conférence Internationale pour l’unification du droit pénal (Bruxelles, 26–30 juin 1930) 
(Office de Publicité, 1931); Quatrième conférence Internationale pour l’unification du droit pénal (Paris, 
27–30 décembre 1931) (Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1933); Cinquième conférence Internationale pour 
l’unification du droit pénal (Madrid, 14–20 octobre 1933) (A Pedone, 1935); Sixième conférence 
internationale pour l’unification du droit pénal (Copenhague, 31 août – 3 septembre 1935) (A Pedone, 
1938). 
8  Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, opened for signature 16 November 1937, 
LN Doc C.546(I).M.383.1937.V (never entered into force) reproduced in ‘Instruments of the International 
Conference on the Repression of Terrorism (Geneva, November 1st–16th, 1937)’ (1938) 19 League of 
Nations Official Journal 23. 
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thereafter to become a fixture of the international community’s counter-terrorism 
efforts. In part due to the political situation in Europe in the late 1930s, the 
League of Nations Terrorism Convention did not receive sufficient ratifications 
and never entered into force.  
The international community returned to matters of terrorism after the bulk of 
Nazi war crimes trials were complete – this time, however, terrorism was to be 
dealt with as one of a group of international crimes. The ILC, in its first and 
second drafts of the Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, dealt only with the jus ad bellum aspects of state involvement in 
terrorism.9 But influenced by the famous Nuremberg judgment pronouncement 
that ‘[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can  
the provisions of international law be enforced’, 10  the ILC’s framework for 
addressing state involvement in terrorism was that of individual criminal 
responsibility. Work on the ILC Draft Code was suspended in 1954, pending 
progress on the definition of aggression.11 
Between 1954 and 1974 (when aggression was finally defined by the General 
Assembly12), the face of terrorism changed somewhat. While states continued to 
sponsor and support terrorist conduct (allowing them to accomplish their foreign 
policy objectives in deniable fashion, as a clandestine and low-level alternative to 
an outright use of force), NSAs began to use transnational violence to accomplish 
their own political objectives. In particular, the international community’s focus 
on non-state terrorism sharpened in the late 1960s with the surge in airplane 
hijackings and acts of violence against civil aviation committed by NSAs  
for political purposes. 13  The response of the International Civil Aviation 
                                                 
9  See Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind in ‘Report of the International 
Law Commission to the General Assembly’ [1951] II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
123, 133 art 2(6) and commentary. The commentary notes that the crime of terrorism can only be 
committed by a state although individual criminal responsibility can arise regarding conspiracy, 
complicity or direct incitement. 
10  ‘Judgment of 1 October 1946’ in Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military 
Tribunal (Nuremberg, 1947) 171, 223. 
11  Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, GA Res 897 (IX), UN GAOR, 9th 
sess, 504th plen mtg, Supp No 21, UN Doc A/RES/9/897 (4 December 1954); John F Murphy, ‘Defining 
International Terrorism: A Way Out of the Quagmire’ (1990) 19 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 13, 
15.  
12  Definition of Aggression, GA Res 3314 (XXIX), UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 29th sess, 2319th plen mtg, 
Agenda Item 86, UN Doc A/RES/29/3314 (14 December 1974) annex. 
13  Between 1960 and 1967, there were an average of five hijackings per year. That number increased to 35 
in 1968 and reached an overwhelming 89 in 1969: Alona E Evans, ‘Aircraft and Aviation Facilities’ in 
Alona E Evans and John F Murphy (eds), Legal Aspects of International Terrorism (Lexington Books, 
1978) 3, 4–6. See also Grant Wardlaw, ‘State Response to International Terrorism: Some Cautionary 
Comments’ in Robert O Slater and Michael Stohl (eds), Current Perspectives on International Terrorism 
(Macmillan Press, 1988) 206, 206–7; Measures to Prevent International Terrorism: Study Prepared by 
the Secretariat, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 27th sess, Agenda Item 92, UN Doc A/C.6/418 (2 November 
1972) 32–4 [47]–[50] (the Sixth Committee Secretariat sets forth the chain of events leading up to the 
ICAO’s sponsoring of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for 
signature 16 December 1970, 860 UNTS 105 (entered into force 14 October 1971) (‘Hague Convention’), 
and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for 
signature 23 September 1971, 974 UNTS 177 (entered into force 26 January 1973) (‘Montreal 
 
2016 Thematic: The Potentialities and Limitations of Reactive Law Making 1195
Organization (‘ICAO’) to this turn in terrorist events was to adopt two 
conventions aimed specifically at suppressing these forms of violence: the Hague 
Convention 14  and the Montreal Convention. 15  As the specialised UN agency 
tasked with promoting the safe and orderly development of international civil 
aviation throughout the world, it was entirely appropriate that the surge in 
hijackings and violence against civil aviation should be addressed within the 
framework of the ICAO. But given the ICAO’s limited mandate, the conventions 
could do no more than address terrorist violence in that one limited (aviation) 
context. There was obviously no question of the ICAO addressing terrorist 
violence more broadly. The Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention 
were also drafted with the problem of non-state terrorism in its 1960s/1970s 
incarnation in mind – the earlier League of Nations and ILC Draft Code link 
between state terrorism and individual criminal responsibility was severed and 
replaced by a focus on NSAs and state co-operation in suppressing their 
conduct.16 With these first two terrorism suppression conventions – and their 
narrow application to specific acts of terrorism in isolation from other terrorist 
crimes, and contemplation of non-state conduct – the sectoral approach to 
terrorism suppression was born.  
From 1970 on, the treaty regime addressing international terrorism has 
followed the ICAO model. In the case of each terrorism suppression 
convention,17 the catalyst for addressing a particular manifestation of terrorism 
                                                                                                                         
Convention’), including the increase in hijacking, and General Assembly and Security Council 
resolutions expressing concern over the unlawful interference with international aviation). 
14  See below n 17. 
15  Ibid.  
16  This is not to say that the terrorism suppression conventions only apply to non-state conduct, (see 
Kimberley N Trapp, ‘Holding States Responsible for Terrorism before the International Court of Justice’ 
(2012) 3 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 279), but it is to say that the galvanising acts of 
‘headline-grabbing’ terrorism by NSAs focused attention in particular on non-state terrorism. In respect 
of the comprehensive convention, discussed below (see below n 46 et seq), whether ‘state terrorism’ 
should be covered by the Convention remains a controversial issue. See, eg, Report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, UN GAOR, 68th 
sess, Supp No 37, UN Doc A/68/37 (15 May 2013) annex II, 18–19 (‘2013 Report’). The two main 
circulated drafts of the relevant provision differ in that the one circulated by the coordinator and 
supported mainly by Western states seeks to exclude the activities of state forces in exercise of their 
official duties from the scope of a comprehensive convention all together, while the Organisation of 
Islamic Cooperation’s draft qualifies this, seeking for any exclusion to apply only insofar as such acts are 
in conformity with other international law obligations: See at annex II, 18–19. 
17  To date, there are 13 international conventions and protocols that require states parties to (i) criminalise a 
particular manifestation of international terrorism under domestic law; (ii) co-operate in the prevention of 
that terrorist act; and (iii) take action to ensure that alleged offenders are held responsible for their crime 
(through the imposition of an obligation to extradite or submit the alleged offender to prosecution): 
Hague Convention arts 1, 2, 7 (the obligation to co-operate in the prevention of the proscribed terrorist 
conduct is absent in this Convention); Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature 10 September 2010, DCAS Doc No 22 (not yet in 
force) arts II–III (‘2010 Protocol to the Hague Convention’); Montreal Convention arts 1, 3, 7, 10; 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil 
Aviation, opened for signature 24 February 1988, 1589 UNTS 474 (entered into force 6 August 1989) art 
II; Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, opened for 
signature 10 September 2010, DCAS Doc No 21 (not yet in force) arts 1, 3, 10, 16 (‘Beijing 
Convention’); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
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was a ‘headline-grabbing’ act of terrorism (or a series of such acts) – crimes 
which ‘shocked the conscience of mankind’ and called for action. 18  The 
reactionary nature of this form of law making, and the galvanising effect of 
‘headline-grabbing’ crimes on political will, can be illustrated by a few 
examples. 
Following the Munich Olympics hostage crisis and other similar hostage-
takings, Germany proposed the adoption of an international convention for the 
suppression of hostage takings.19 Negotiation of the convention was protracted, 
not least because of the association between the catalysing hostage event and 
struggles for self-determination (discussed further below), but the Iran/US 
hostage crisis in November 1979 pushed states to act and there was some 
compromise on the relationship between terrorism suppression and self-
determination.20 The Hostages Convention was finally adopted on 17 December 
1979 and required states to criminalise hostage takings with a transnational 
element and to extradite or submit alleged offenders to prosecution.21 
On 7 October 1985, an Italian flag cruise ship (the ‘Achille Lauro’) sailing 
from Alexandria to Port Said was seized by members of the Palestinian 
Liberation Front (‘PLF’) posing as tourists. The PLF held the crew and 
                                                                                                                         
Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature 14 December 1973, 1035 UNTS 167 (entered 
into force 20 February 1977) arts 2, 4, 7 (‘Internationally Protected Persons Convention’); International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, opened for signature 17 December 1979, 1316 UNTS 205 
(entered into force 3 June 1983) arts 1, 2, 4, 8 (‘Hostages Convention’); Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 
UNTS 221 (entered into force 1 March 1992) arts 3, 5, 10, 13 (‘SUA Convention’); Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 
opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 304 (entered into force 1 March 1992) arts 1–2; 
Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, opened for signature 14 October 2005, IMO Doc LEG/CONF.15/21 (entered into force 28 
July 2010) (‘2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention’) arts 4, 5, 12; International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, opened for signature 15 December 1997, 2149 UNTS 256 (entered 
into force 23 May 2001) arts 2, 4, 8, 15 (‘Terrorist Bombing Convention’); International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature 9 December 1999, 2178 UNTS 197 
(entered into force 10 April 2002) arts 2, 4, 10, 18 (‘Terrorism Financing Convention’); International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, opened for signature 13 April 2005, 2445 
UNTS 89 (entered into force 7 July 2007) arts 2, 5, 7, 11 (‘Nuclear Terrorism Convention’). Collectively, 
these conventions are referred to in this article as the ‘terrorism suppression conventions’ or the ‘TSCs’. 
18  That terrorist crimes might ‘shock the conscience of mankind’ was also one of the reasons certain states 
argued in favour of including international terrorism in the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction. 
See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN 
GAOR, 51st sess, Supp No 22, UN Doc A/51/22 (13 September 1996) vol I, 26 [106]. Similarly, see, eg, 
Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Germany, Request for the Inclusion 
of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Thirty-First Session: Drafting of an International Convention 
against the Taking of Hostages, 31st sess, UN Doc A/31/242 (28 September 1976) annex 1 [5] (‘Letter 
from Germany’).  
19  Letter from Germany, UN Doc A/31/242, annex. Germany’s request was acknowledged by the General 
Assembly and an ad hoc committee was tasked with producing a draft. See Report of the Sixth 
Committee: Drafting of an International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 6th Comm, 31st sess, 
Agenda Item 123, UN Doc A/31/430 (14 December 1976) 1 [1]–[3]; Drafting of an International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages, GA Res 31/103, UN GAOR, 31st sess, 99th plen mtg, Supp 
No 39, UN Doc A/RES/31/103 (15 December 1976). 
20  See below nn 75–9 and accompanying text. 
21  Hostages Convention arts 1, 2, 8. 
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passengers hostage, demanding the release of 50 Palestinians from Israeli 
custody. The ship was refused permission to dock in Syria – following which the 
PLF shipjackers killed a disabled American passenger. The ship was thereafter 
granted permission to dock at its destination port and the PLF released all 
hostages in return for a promise of safe passage out of the country.22 On 10 
October 1985, the shipjackers and two accomplices were flown out of Egypt on a 
government-chartered airliner. The American government, learning of the 
agreement between Egypt and the shipjackers, intercepted the aircraft over 
international waters, forced it to land at Sigonella Air Base in Sicily,23 and turned 
the shipjackers over to the Italian government. 24  In defence of their action, 
American officials cited Egypt’s obligation under the Hostages Convention to 
either prosecute or extradite the hijackers.25 The Hostages Convention, however, 
was not considered specific enough to address the particular jurisdictional issues 
raised by shipjackings, given the possibility that the hostage-taking might be 
undertaken in international waters. As a result, states began negotiating a 
shipjacking convention under the auspices of the UN specialised agency 
mandated with the safety and security of maritime shipping (the International 
Maritime Organization). Negotiations resulted in the adoption of the 1988 SUA 
Convention, which obliges states to criminalise shipjackings and to extradite or 
submit alleged offenders to prosecution.26 
On 26 February 1993, a 1200 pound car bomb was detonated in the 
underground parking structure of the North Tower of the New York City World 
Trade Centre.27 The explosion was intended to knock the North Tower into the 
South Tower, bringing both down.28 The explosion did neither, but did kill six 
people and injured a further 1000. A little over a year later (on 18 July 1994), a 
van packed with explosives was driven into a seven-storey Jewish-Argentine 
community centre in Buenos Aires. The explosion reduced the building to rubble 
and killed 96 people, injuring another 300.29 The Buenos Aires attack was widely 
                                                 
22  Judith Miller, ‘2-Day Drama Ends: 4 Surrender to PLO – New Yorker Reported Killed by Gunmen’, The 
New York Times (New York), 10 October 1985, A1, A11. 
23  Bernard Gwertzman, ‘Flown from Cairo: 4 in Custody in Sicily – Washington Says It Wants Extradition’, 
The New York Times (New York), 11 October 1985, A1, A10. 
24  Don A Schanche, ‘Italy Convicts 11 Men in Achille Lauro Hijacking: None Singled Out as Leon 
Klinghoffer Murderer; Victim’s Daughters Say Sentences Are Too Lenient’, Los Angeles Times (Los 
Angeles), 11 July 1986, 1. 
25  Stuart Taylor Jr, ‘Plane Diversion Raises Legal Issues’, The New York Times (New York), 11 October 
1985, A11. Egypt claimed that it had fulfilled its international obligation to extradite or prosecute by 
turning the suspected terrorists over to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation authorities for prosecution. 
See Judith Miller, ‘Egypt Says It Gave Gunmen to PLO: Disputes US Account on How Long Terrorists 
Remained in Custody of Cairo’, The New York Times (New York), 11 October 1985, A11. 
26  SUA Convention arts 3, 5, 10(1). 
27  Jesse Greenspan, ‘Remembering the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing’, History (online), 26 February 
2013 <http://www.history.com/news/remembering-the-1993-world-trade-center-bombing>. 
28  The failed attempt to bring the towers down from below, executed by Ramzi Yousef (Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammed’s nephew), is widely credited with the ‘idea’ of bringing them down from above as carried 
out on 9/11. 
29  Keesing’s Record of World Events, vol 40 (July 1994) 120–1. 
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believed to have been carried out by Palestinian affiliated groups.30 During the 
next two years, several headline bombings and similar terrorist attacks took place 
in Saudi Arabia, Tokyo, Sri Lanka, Israel and Manchester.31 Following these 
incidents, the General Assembly noted ‘that terrorist attacks by means of bombs, 
explosives or other incendiary or lethal devices have become increasingly 
widespread’, stressed ‘the need to supplement the existing legal instruments in 
order to address specifically the problem of terrorist attacks carried out by such 
means’, and decided to ‘establish an Ad Hoc Committee … to elaborate an 
international convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings’. 32  The 
Terrorist Bombing Convention, incorporating the core set of obligations set out in 
the previous terrorism suppression conventions but limited in scope to terrorist 
bombings, was adopted in 1997.33 
 
III   POTENTIALITIES OF REACTIVE LAW MAKING? 
Reactive treaty making in the form of the terrorism suppression treaty regime 
– driven by the conduct of NSAs and as a result always lagging behind it – is 
often qualified in negative (or at least not positive) terms. 34  But there are 
potentialities to this form of international law making. Of particular relevance in 
respect of the terrorism suppression regime, reactive law making has created the 
space for targeted compromise where there was little hope of such compromise 
as a matter of general principle (as explored in Part III(A) below) and has 
provided the opportunity to fine tune the terrorism suppression regime in a way 
that is responsive to developments in international law over time (as explored in 
Part III(B) below).  
 
                                                 
30  See Sergio Kiernan, ‘Why Argentina’s Jewish Center Bombing Remains Unsolved’, The New York Times 
(online), 28 August 1996 <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/28/opinion/28iht-edserg.t.html>. Initial 
investigations were seriously mismanaged and marred by corruption. It was only in November 2005 that 
a joint effort by Argentinean intelligence and the FBI resulted in the identification of the suicide bomber 
responsible for the attack on the community centre as Ibrahim Hussein Berro, a member of Hezbollah: 
‘Buenos Aires Bomber “Identified”’, BBC (online), 10 November 2005 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
americas/4423612.stm>. Hezbollah issued a statement denying allegations that it had been involved in the 
Jewish community centre attack: Keesing’s Record of World Events, vol 51 (November 2005) 46 927. 
31  US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1995 (1996) 5, 22; US Department of State, 
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996 (1997) 28–9, 32–3, 35. 
32  Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, GA Res 51/210, UN GAOR, 51st sess, 88th plen mtg, 
Agenda Item 151, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/51/210 (17 December 1996) Preamble, para 9 (‘GA 
Establishment of Ad Hoc Committee of 51/210’).  
33  Terrorist Bombing Convention arts 2, 4, 8. 
34  See, eg, Ben Saul, ‘Terrorism as a Legal Concept’ in Genevieve Lennon and Clive Walker (eds), 
Routledge Handbook of Law and Terrorism (Routledge, 2015) 19, 24; G Gilbert, ‘The “Law” and 
“Transnational Terrorism”’ (1995) 26 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3, 14; John Murphy, 
‘International Law and the War on Terrorism: The Road Ahead’ (2002) 79 International Law Studies 
391, 399. 
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A   The Politics of Avoidance or the Avoidance of Politics –  
The Interaction between the Rights and ‘Responsibilities’ of NSAs 
A treaty regime which is driven by particular instances of terrorist crime has 
a very precise focal point – and the precision of a focal point has the potential to 
distract or shift attention from broader intractable debates. In the terrorism 
suppression context, one of those intractable debates has been in reference to the 
limitations (if any) on the right of a people to use violence in their struggle for 
self-determination. The sectoral approach to terrorism suppression has in effect 
(if not by design) freed up the space for co-operation in a targeted way, while 
leaving this very difficult debate to be resolved in the content of a comprehensive 
terrorism suppression convention. This section examines the terrorism/self-
determination debate and its impact on the (to date failed) efforts to tackle 
terrorism suppression generally, and concludes that tackling terrorism 
suppression on a reactive, crime by crime, basis has been an advantage in 
securing agreement and co-operation. 
The League of Nations Terrorism Convention defined ‘acts of terrorism’ 
generally as ‘criminal acts directed against a state and intended or calculated to 
create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or 
the general public’,35 and required states to criminalise enumerated acts to the 
extent that they met the elements of that general definition.36 The enumerated acts 
were broadly defined, focusing on targets rather than particular manifestations of 
violence. This approach was adopted in order to avoid excluding as yet 
unanticipated ways and means of harming public interests in a way that would 
limit the capacity of the treaty to address terrorist violence in whatever future 
form it might take. 37  The concern with comprehensiveness is prescient – 
highlighting as it does one of the pitfalls of an overly reactive approach to 
terrorism suppression.38 
A comprehensive approach to terrorism suppression, however, was not to be 
the way forward in the post-WWII era. This is principally the result of the 
interaction between rights and criminal responsibilities of NSAs: the emergence 
of non-state terrorism (and the international community’s criminal law 
enforcement approach thereto) coincided with developments in post-colonial 
governance and a long overdue focus on the right to self-determination.39 The 
                                                 
35  League of Nations Terrorism Convention art 1(2).  
36  The enumerated acts of violence included acts which endangered the life or liberty of protected persons 
(heads of state etc); acts which endangered the life of members of the public; wilful destruction of public 
property; and the procurement of weapons for the purposes of committing any of the enumerated 
offences: see League of Nations Terrorism Convention art 2. 
37  The Convention was intended to ‘prohibit any form of preparation or execution of terrorist outrages’: 
League of Nations, Resolution Adopted by the Assembly on October 10th, 1936 in Proceedings of the 
International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism: Geneva, November 1st to 16th, 1937, LN Doc 
C.94.M.47.1938.V (1 June 1938) annex 1, 183 (emphasis added) (‘Proceedings of the International 
Conference on the Repression of Terrorism’). 
38  See Part III(B), ‘Responsiveness of the Treaty Regime’, below.  
39  The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples was recognised in the Charter of the 
United Nations art 1(2), and has been re-affirmed in several General Assembly resolutions and 
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relationship between terrorism suppression and the right of self-determination 
has been a site of contestation since the Secretary-General first placed 
international terrorism on the General Assembly’s agenda in 1972.40 The early 
position of the Non-aligned Movement (‘NAM’)41 members in this debate was to 
emphasise the right to struggle for self-determination and to argue that the means 
used in such struggles should not be restricted (and should certainly not be 
qualified as ‘terrorist’).42 NAM’s position took the form of a definitional claim – 
that ‘terrorism’ should be defined so as to exclude any acts carried out in 
furtherance of a struggle for self-determination. 
The flipside of this position, advanced principally by Western states, was to 
object to an ‘ends justify the means’ approach – and in particular to argue that the 
legitimacy of a cause could not justify violence against the ‘innocent’.43 NAM’s 
conflation of limitations on the means and methods of exercising a right (which is 
permissible), and limiting the right itself (which is impermissible) was rejected. 
                                                                                                                         
declarations since then, including the UN Declaration on Friendly Relations 1970, UN Doc 
A/RES/25/2625, adopted in the same year as the Hague Convention. 
40  The Secretary-General tried to avoid the political quagmire of characterisation (freedom fighter vs 
terrorist) by claiming that he had the general issue of terrorism, and no specific acts or actors, in mind: 
see ‘Questions Related to International Terrorism’ (1972) 26 Yearbook of the United Nations 639, 640. It 
is nevertheless widely accepted that the Secretary-General was reacting to the massacre of Israeli athletes 
by Black September at the Munich Olympics on 5 September 1972 and the attack against civilian 
passengers at Lod Airport in Israel by Japanese terrorists (working with the PLO) on 30 May 1972. See 
especially Abraham D Sofaer, ‘Terrorism and the Law’ (1986) 64 Foreign Affairs 901, 903; Joseph J 
Lambert, Terrorism and Hostages in International Law: A Commentary on the Hostages Convention 
1979 (Grotius Publications, 1990), 32; Valentin A Romanov, ‘The United Nations and the Problem of 
Combatting International Terrorism’ (1990) 2 Terrorism and Political Violence 289, 295. 
41  For a full list of members, see Non-aligned Movement, Background – The Non-aligned Movement: 
Member States (23 January 2002) <http://www.nam.gov.za/background/members.htm>. 
42  Nigeria, eg, stated that ‘people struggling to liberate themselves from oppression and exploitation have 
the right to use all methods at their disposal, including force’: Ad Hoc Committee on International 
Terrorism, Observations of States Submitted in Accordance with General Assembly Resolution 
3034(XXVII): Addendum, UN Doc A/AC.160/1/Add.1 (12 June 1973) 26 (‘Observations of States 
Addendum 1’). See also at 28 (USSR), 29 (Yemen); Ad Hoc Committee, Observations of States 
Submitted in Accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII), UN Doc A/AC.160/1 (16 May 
1973) 14 (Iran), 17 (Lebanon), 34 (Syrian Arab Republic) (‘Observations of States’); Ad Hoc Committee, 
Observations of States Submitted in Accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII): 
Analytical Study Prepared by the Secretary General, UN Doc A/AC.160/2 (22 June 1973) 7–8 [13]–[14] 
(‘Analytical Study’). This position was an important feature of the Hostages Convention negotiations. 
NAM members highlighted that, in condemning practices of apartheid, the UN could not tie the hands of 
the victims of those practices in their attempts to recover their freedom. See below n 71. 
43  See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN GAOR, 28th sess, Supp No 28, UN 
Doc A/9028 (1973) 7–8 [22]–[23]; Observations of States, UN Doc A/AC.160/1, 5 (Austria), 11 
(Germany), 23 (Portugal), 24–6 (South Africa), 42 (UK), 44 (USA); Observations of States Addendum 1, 
UN Doc A/AC.160/1/Add.1, 12 (Holy See), 27 (Switzerland); Analytical Study, UN Doc A/AC.160/2, 8 
[15]; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN GAOR, 32nd sess, Supp No 37, 
UN Doc A/32/37 (28 April 1977) (‘1977 Report’) annex, 16 (‘6th Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.160/SR.6 (22 
March 1977) [3] (Austria)), 19 (‘7th Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.160/SR.7 (23 March 1977) [21] (USA)). 
For arguments in support of this position during the negotiation of the Hostages Convention, see, eg, 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention against the Taking of 
Hostages, UN GAOR, 32nd sess, Supp No 39, UN Doc A/32/39 (1977) annex 1, 17 (‘4th Meeting’, UN 
Doc A/AC.188/SR.4 (4 August 1977) [8] (Chile)), 51 (‘11th Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.11 (12 
August 1977) [26] (USA)) (‘Hostages Records’). 
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And on any reading of international humanitarian law (‘IHL’), as it applied 
during the negotiation of the Hostages Convention (the first terrorism 
suppression convention (‘TSC’) to be adopted outside the context of specialised 
UN agencies like the ICAO), this latter position has to be correct. Armed 
conflicts in which a people is fighting in exercise of its right to self-determination 
were recognised as international armed conflicts to which the full body of IHL 
applies from 1977 onwards with the adoption of Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (‘API’).44 Article 1(4) of 
the API incorporates factually non-international armed conflicts (those between 
NSAs – or a people fighting in exercise of their right of self-determination – and 
a state) into the legal definition of international armed conflict (which had until 
API been defined as a conflict between two states).45  
Given that article 1(4) of the API obliges a people fighting in exercise of its 
right of self-determination to conduct hostilities in compliance with restrictions 
on means and methods of warfare imposed by IHL, the terrorism/self-
determination debate is one which ought to be understood in terms of regime 
interaction, not the definition of terrorism. What is at stake is the applicability of 
two separate regimes, and the issue is whether conduct in furtherance of a 
struggle for self-determination should fall within the scope (and be evaluated on 
the basis) of the terrorism suppression regime or IHL. 
Nevertheless, there are still some states that insist on characterising the 
matter as a question of definition.46 In part, it is this insistence which precludes 
consensus on the adoption of a comprehensive terrorism suppression convention 
                                                 
44  Opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978). 
45  The circumstances under which a non-international armed conflict will amount to an international armed 
conflict because a people is fighting in exercise of a right of self-determination, as envisioned in API art 
1(4), is not defined clearly in the Additional Protocol. The Commentary to API suggests optimistically 
that it is a question of ‘common sense’: see International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on 
the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1987) 56 [118]. 
46  Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 
1996, UN GAOR, 59th sess, Supp No 37, UN Doc A/59/37 (2 July 2004) annex I, 7–8 [15]–[17]. See in 
particular, proposals that self-determination be excluded from the definition of terrorism: Summary 
Record, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 55th sess, 27th mtg, Agenda Items 164 and 155, UN Doc A/C.6/55/SR.27 
(24 November 2000) 8 [41]–[43] (Qatar), 8–9 [44]–[45] (Egypt); Report of the Working Group on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 55th sess, Agenda Item 164, UN 
Doc A/C.6/55/L.2 (19 October 2000) annex III, 37–8 [30] (Malaysia). See also Report of the Working 
Group: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 60th sess, Agenda Item 
108, UN Doc A/C.6/60/L.6 (14 October 2005) annex, 4–7 [2]–[17]. No progress has been made on this 
issue: see the Reports of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 
17 December 1996: UN GAOR, 61st sess, Supp No 37, UN Doc A/61/37 (2006) annex I, 4 [2]; UN 
GAOR, 62nd sess, Supp No 37, UN Doc A/62/37 (2007) annex, 6 [5], 7–9 [11]–[21]; UN GAOR, 63rd 
sess, Supp No 37, UN Doc A/63/37 (2008) annex I, 6 [5]–[6]; UN GAOR, 64th sess, Supp No 37, UN 
Doc A/64/37 (2009) annex I, 6 [6]; UN GAOR, 65th sess, Supp No 37, UN Doc A/65/37 (2010) annex I, 5 
[3], 6–7 [11]; UN GAOR, 66th sess, Supp No 37, UN Doc A/66/37 (2011) annex I, 5 [2], 7 [10], 8–9 [18]; 
2013 Report, UN Doc A/68/37 annex III, 20 [4], 22 [13]. See also Summary Record, UN GAOR, 6th 
Comm, 69th sess, 1st mtg, Agenda Item 107, UN Doc A/C.6/69/SR.1 (20 October 2014) 3 [20] (Iran), 12 
[81] (UAE); Summary Record, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 70th sess, 1st mtg, Agenda Item 108, UN Doc 
A/C.6/70/SR.1 (23 October 2015) 4 [29] (Iran).  
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(to sit alongside the sectoral regime and fill in its gaps), given that a general 
definition of terrorism would be a necessary element thereof. UN efforts to 
elaborate such a comprehensive convention have been ongoing for over 10 
years.47  To date, there has been no consensus on whether acts committed in 
furtherance of a people’s right of self-determination should be defined and 
criminalised as terrorism under the draft comprehensive convention.48 
A regime interaction approach, however, is indeed taken in the existing 
TSCs, given that self-determination has not been addressed as a matter  
of definition, but purely as a matter of exclusion from the scope of the TSCs on 
the basis that other regimes, like IHL, apply. 49  This is not to say that the  
                                                 
47  Prior to Germany’s proposal for the Hostages Convention, the USA had submitted a comprehensive Draft 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism, UN GAOR, 
6th Comm, 27th sess, Agenda Item 92, UN Doc A/C.6/L.850 (25 September 1972). However, due to 
widespread opposition, the General Assembly voted instead to establish an Ad Hoc Committee tasked 
with making ‘recommendations for possible co-operation for the speedy elimination of [international 
terrorism]’: Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, GA Res 3034 (XXVII), UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 
27th sess, 2114th plen mtg, Agenda Item 92, Supp No 30, UN Doc A/RES/27/3034 (18 December 1972) 
paras 9–10. The Committee’s work was suspended as a result of significant political disagreement: see 
Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, GA Res 31/102, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 31st sess, 99th plen 
mtg, Agenda Item 113, Supp No 39, UN Doc A/RES/21/102 (15 December 1976) Preamble; 1977 
Report, UN Doc A/32/37, [4]. In 1996, a draft comprehensive terrorism suppression convention was 
proposed again, this time by India: Permanent Representative of India, Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 51st sess, Agenda Item 151, UN Doc A/C.6/51/6 (11 
November 1996) annex. Pursuant to the GA Establishment of Ad Hoc Committee of 51/210, UN Doc 
A/RES/51/210, para 9 another Ad Hoc Committee was established with a view to ‘developing a 
comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism’. It was clarified soon 
after, that this included ‘the elaboration of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism’: 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, GA Res 53/108, UN GAOR, 53rd sess, 83rd plen mtg, 
Agenda Item 155, UN Doc A/RES/53/108 (26 January 1999) para 11. In 2013, when the Ad Hoc 
Committee last convened, it noted that ‘more time was required to achieve substantive progress on the 
outstanding issues’: 2013 Report, UN Doc A/68/37 3 [12]. Since disagreement persists, the General 
Assembly recommended that the Sixth Committee establish a Working Group in 2016 to finalise the 
drafting process: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, GA Res 70/120, UN GAOR, 70th sess, 
75th plen mtg, Agenda Item 108, UN Doc A/RES/70/120 (18 December 2015) para 24. The call to finalise 
the comprehensive convention, however, is one that has been made before. See, eg, Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism, GA Res 67/99, UN GAOR, 67th sess, 56th plen mtg, Agenda Item 105, 
Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/67/99 (14 December 2012) para 24; Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism, GA Res 68/119, UN GAOR, 68th sess, 68th plen mtg, Agenda Item 110, Supp No 49, UN Doc 
A/RES/68/119 (18 December 2013) para 24. And it is doubtful that the likelihood of reaching final 
agreement on the relationship between terrorism and self-determination for the purposes of finalising a 
comprehensive terrorism suppression convention will increase in the foreseeable future: see Roger 
O’Keefe, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 272. 
48  One of the main points of contention that prevented agreement in the 1970s attempts to make 
comprehensive progress on the suppression of terrorism through the Ad Hoc Committee was the self-
determination issue: see, eg, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, UN GAOR, 
34th sess, Supp No 37, UN Doc A/34/37 (17 April 1979) 9–10 [28]–[31]; Jörg Friedrichs, ‘Defining the 
International Public Enemy: The Political Struggle behind the Legal Debate on International Terrorism’ 
(2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 69, 73. Since the start of the second attempt to draft a 
comprehensive terrorism suppression convention, the self-determination issue remains a source of 
disagreement: see, eg, UN GAOR, 56th sess, 12th plen mtg, Agenda Item 166, UN Doc A/56/PV.12 (1 
October 2001) 3; see above n 46. 
49  On the TSC regime interaction principles, see Part IV below. 
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self-determination issue was absent from negotiations of the TSCs.50 But with 
attention focused on particularly egregious crimes (rather than a general 
definition which encapsulates a wide spectrum of violence), states have managed 
to agree to disagree on terrorism generally for the sake of bringing a targeted 
criminal law enforcement framework into effect. Acts of international terrorism 
which capture the attention of the international press and domestic constituencies 
both provide the opportunity for compromise and pressure states to come to a 
settlement which facilitates action. States need to be seen to be doing something 
– and reactive treaty making, driven by ‘headline-grabbing’ terrorism, satisfies 
that need while also developing a genuine platform for counter-terrorism co-
operation. States parties have been more willing to compromise on the self-
determination issue in respect of particular crimes than they would be willing to 
do as a matter of general principle. The result is at least some co-operation on 
terrorism suppression – even if not as comprehensive as might be hoped.  
 
B   Responsiveness of the Treaty Regime 
As we have seen, the political will to address a specific manifestation of 
terrorism has emerged either in response to a particularly egregious use of 
terrorist violence by NSAs or a sharp increase in that ‘type’ of terrorist violence. 
Given the time it thereafter takes to finalise a convention addressing the 
particular violence, the international legal regime on terrorism suppression lags 
behind the realities of terrorist conduct. In this sense, a reactive criminal law 
enforcement treaty regime, responding to the ever evolving conduct of NSAs, is 
seemingly ‘passive’. The resulting gaps in treaty coverage, and the concomitant 
failure to concentrate the terrorism prevention efforts of states on as yet 
unanticipated terrorist activities, make the regime vulnerable and less effective in 
its broad aims of terrorism suppression.51 
In other respects, however, a reactive treaty regime – spinning out TSCs over 
time – enables terrorism suppression efforts to respond to developments in 
international law. The adoption of treaties by consensus through negotiation at 
multi-lateral conferences (at which the vast majority of states will have some 
representation) is somewhat of a miracle of compromise. States will naturally be 
reluctant to open these miracles up to subsequent amendment – even to respond 
to important developments in international law which bear on the treaty 
obligations (and which it may not be possible to accommodate through systemic 
interpretation in reliance on article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (‘VCLT’)52  in the face of clear contrary language). The terrorism 
suppression regime, with its newly tweaked iterations of the same treaty 
(different focus) adopted over time, provides an interesting opportunity to 
incorporate these developments. 
Let us consider the League of Nations Terrorism Convention by way of 
illustrating the added responsiveness of a treaty regime which emerges over time. 
                                                 
50  See Part IV below. 
51  See above n 34. 
52  Opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980). 
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While the Convention never entered into force, it nevertheless served as a model 
for the modern TSCs. Having said so, it contained a rather ineffective obligation 
to extradite or prosecute, which reflected some of the limitations of international 
law at the time.53 In particular, the League of Nations Terrorism Convention 
admitted the possibility of impunity for acts of terrorism through its 
contemplation of situations in which a state could not extradite a foreigner,54 but 
could not prosecute because it had not exercised its prescriptive jurisdiction over 
offences committed abroad by foreigners.55 This jurisdictional gap reflects the 
absence of a broad conception of universal jurisdiction (customary or treaty 
based) at the time the Convention was adopted.56 This first attempt to address the 
difficulties in bringing transnational terrorists to justice, limited by the stage of 
development of the international legal system at the time, has been improved 
upon. The modern version of the obligation to extradite or submit to prosecution 
in the TSCs is supported by an obligation to establish universal jurisdiction over 
defined offences, and to exercise that jurisdiction (whether through extradition or 
submission to prosecution) whenever an alleged offender is in a state party’s 
territory.57 Subject to the extent of ratification of the TSCs, the result should be 
                                                 
53  League of Nations Terrorism Convention arts 8–9. 
54  Initial proposals were to make the ‘extradite or prosecute’ obligation mandatory and without exception 
(but subject to some form of complementarity of jurisdiction, in that prosecution before an international 
criminal court with jurisdiction over terrorist offences was envisaged). Such proposals were unsuccessful, 
principally because the political climate reigning at the time meant that states sought to retain the 
flexibility to refuse extradition on the basis of the political offence exception: see, eg, Proceedings of the 
International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, LN Doc C.94.M.47.1938.V, 52–4, 62; League 
of Nations Assembly, ‘Records of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly: Minutes of the 
First Committee’ (1936) Special Supplement No 156 League of Nations Official Journal 1, 33, 37, 39–41, 
43, 48; League of Nations, International Repression of Terrorism: Observations by Governments on 
Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism; Draft Convention for the Creation of 
an International Criminal Court, Series I, LN Doc A.24.1936.V (1936), 11; Geoffrey Marston, ‘Early 
Attempts to Suppress Terrorism: The Terrorism and International Criminal Court Conventions of 1937’ 
[2002] British Yearbook of International Law 293, 311; Saul, above n 34, 21–2; Lambert, above n 40, 29. 
As a result, extradition was ‘subject to any conditions and limitations recognised by the law or the 
practice of the country to which application is made’: League of Nations Terrorism Convention art 8(4). 
See also Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 86–7. 
55  League of Nations Terrorism Convention art 10. See in particular Poland’s comments during negotiation 
of the Convention, highlighting these potential ‘loop-holes which would make it possible for acts of 
terrorism to go unpunished, contrary to the intention of the Convention’: League of Nations, International 
Repression of Terrorism: Observations by Governments on Draft Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism; Draft Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, Series 
II, LN Doc A.24(a).1936.V (1936). 
56  Universal jurisdiction was, at the time, only recognised vis-à-vis piracy. See American Law Institute, 
Restatement of the Law – Second: Foreign Relations Law of the United States (American Law Institute, 
1965) 94–7; SS ‘Lotus’ (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10, 69–71 (Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Moore); United States v Layton, 509 F Supp 212, 223 (Chief Judge Peckham) (ND Cal 
1981). 
57  The TSCs require states to establish prescriptive jurisdiction over relevant terrorist crimes – even in the 
absence of any other jurisdictional nexus: Hague Convention art 4(2); Montreal Convention art 5(2); 
Internationally Protected Persons Convention art 3(2); Hostages Conventions art 5(2); SUA Convention 
art 6(4); Terrorist Bombing Convention art 6(4); Terrorism Financing Convention art 7(4); Nuclear 
Terrorism Convention art 9(4). On whether the TSCs require the exercise of ‘universal jurisdiction’ 
properly so called, or merely ‘jurisdiction to establish a territorial jurisdiction over persons for 
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that there are no safe havens, because (having exercised prescriptive jurisdiction 
on a universal basis) states parties will always be in a position to extradite (in a 
way that meets the double criminality rule) or to submit to prosecution, 
irrespective of the transnational nature of the crime and even in the absence of 
any other jurisdictional nexus.  
This one example illustrates the benefit of the sectoral approach to treaty 
making here under discussion. If a comprehensive terrorism suppression 
convention is adopted, it will limit the need to adopt further treaties, or at least 
make their adoption more difficult to justify – but it will of course be a creature 
of its time, as the League of Nations Terrorism Convention would have been. In 
the last 40 years (from when the first of the modern TSCs was adopted), 
international law has developed (perhaps even exponentially) – in the 
increasingly central role of human rights, shifts in the jus in bello which convert 
self-determination conflicts into international armed conflicts to which the full 
body of IHL applies, and the emergence of a body of law which shifts the 
balance from absolute state discretion in criminal matters towards an end to 
impunity for international crimes (in the form of international criminal law). Had 
a comprehensive terrorism suppression convention been adopted when non-state 
terrorism first called for international co-operation (in 1970), it would have been 
responsive to potential developments in the use of terrorist violence, but would 
not have been responsive to human rights, jus in bello and international criminal 
law developments.  
It is true that TSCs negotiated since the first ICAO TSCs have not changed in 
their core obligations. All the TSCs include an obligation to criminalise a 
particular manifestation of terrorist conduct; the obligation to establish 
jurisdiction over such terrorist crimes (including universal jurisdiction in the 
absence of any other connection to the crime); the obligation to extradite or 
submit alleged offenders to prosecution; and the obligation to co-operate in  
the prevention of that terrorist crime. 58  The relative endurance of these core 
obligations, and the premium states parties place on consistency in language and 
core approach within the TSC regime, is a credit to those who negotiated the 
ICAO TSCs. But, as discussed above, there has been a great deal of ‘collateral’ 
international law development in the last 40 years. These developments are at the 
margins of the core TSC obligations – they do not affect the nature or substance 
of the core obligations per se, but colour the way in which those core obligations 
are to be complied with. The fact that the terrorism suppression regime has been 
adopted over time has enabled states to respond to these developments in each 
new incarnation of the first ICAO TSC.  
                                                                                                                         
extraterritorial events’, see Kimberley N Trapp, State Responsibility for International Terrorism: 
Problems and Prospects (Oxford University Press, 2011) 83 n 107.  
58  See Hague Convention arts 1, 2, 4, 7 (the obligation to co-operate in the prevention of the proscribed 
terrorist conduct is absent in this Convention); Montreal Convention arts 1, 3, 5, 7, 10; Internationally 
Protected Persons Convention arts 2–4, 7; Hostages Convention arts 1, 2, 4, 5, 8; SUA Convention arts 3, 
5, 6, 10, 13; Terrorist Bombing Convention arts 2, 4, 6, 8, 15; Terrorism Financing Convention arts 2, 4, 
7, 10, 18; Nuclear Terrorism Convention arts 2, 5, 7, 9, 11. 
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A very good example of this advantage to reactive treaty making in the 
terrorism context is in reference to the obligation to extradite or submit to 
prosecution. The obligation has remained stable in its formulation – requiring 
states to do so ‘without exception whatsoever’, yet also expressly subjecting 
extradition to the national laws of states parties 59  (which may include an 
exception for political offences). As a result, absent more express language, a 
state’s discretion to refuse extradition on the basis of (for instance) the political 
offence exception should not be presumed to be limited. This freedom to refuse 
extradition was of course much debated in regard to each TSC, and the positions 
adopted by states tracked the broader debates on the relationship between 
terrorism suppression and the right of self-determination. Slowly, however, as 
qualifications to the ways and means of exercising the rights of self-
determination were accepted (in the form of regime interaction between terrorism 
suppression and self-determination through the jus in bello, discussed further 
below), so too were qualifications to the sovereign discretion of each state to 
refuse extradition. 
This changing relationship between terrorism suppression on the one hand, 
and a broad ‘any means to a justified end’ approach to self-determination and the 
concomitant insistence on a broad right to refuse extradition (on the basis of the 
political offence exception in support of such a means/end approach) on the 
other, can be tracked through General Assembly resolutions. 60  The General 
Assembly’s later and much stricter approach to ensuring there was no possibility 
for impunity in the terrorism context, itself a reflection of broader developments 
in international criminal law, greatly influenced the negotiation of the TSCs 
adopted after 1996, in particular as regards the obligation to extradite or submit 
to prosecution and the political offence exception. Because the balance between 
ending impunity for terrorists and protecting the right of peoples to use whatever 
means available in their struggle for self-determination had shifted, the Terrorist 
Bombing Convention (and all TSCs negotiated thereafter) includes an explicit 
                                                 
59  See Hague Convention arts 7, 8; Montreal Convention arts 7, 8; Internationally Protected Persons 
Convention arts 7, 8; Hostages Convention arts 8, 10; SUA Convention arts 10, 11; Terrorist Bombing 
Convention arts 8, 9; Terrorism Financing Convention arts 10, 11; Nuclear Terrorism Convention arts 11, 
13. States negotiating the Hague Convention (the TSC which first used this language, replicated in all 
subsequent TSCs) were divided regarding its effect on the availability of the political offence exception 
as a basis for refusing extradition – both sides considered the language a victory: ICAO, International 
Conference on Private Air Law (1970–1971): Sixteenth Meeting of the Commission of the Whole, ICAO 
Doc 8979-LC/165-1 (11 December 1970) vol 1 [8]–[47]. 
60  The General Assembly’s earliest resolutions addressing terrorism suppression did not unequivocally 
condemn acts of terrorism, but did clearly reaffirm the inalienable right to self-determination. See, eg, 
Measures to Prevent International Terrorism, GA Res 32/147, UN GAOR, 32nd sess, 105th plen mtg, 
Agenda Item 118, Supp No 45, UN Doc A/RES/32/147 (16 December 1977) paras 3–4. By 1996, 
however, in a supplement to its Declaration to Eliminate Terrorism, the General Assembly encouraged 
states,  
when concluding or applying extradition agreements, not to regard as political offences excluded from the 
scope of those agreements offences connected with terrorism which endanger or represent a physical 
threat to the safety and security of persons, whatever the motives which may be invoked to justify them. 
 Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, GA 
Res 51/210, UN GAOR, 51st sess, 88th plen mtg, Agenda Item 151, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/51/210 
(17 December 1996) annex, para 6 (emphasis added). 
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provision that the offences set forth in the Convention shall not be regarded, for 
the purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance, as political offences – and 
a request for extradition may not be refused on the sole ground that it concerns a 
political offence.61 In addition, the Terrorist Bombing Convention and subsequent 
TSCs provide that:  
Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, where 
appropriate, domestic legislation, to ensure that criminal acts within the scope of 
this Convention […]62 are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of 
a political, philosophical, ideological, racial ethnic, religious or other similar 
nature […].63 
This is not to say that all controversy regarding the political offence 
exception, or the distinction between terrorism and self-determination, vanished. 
There were proposals on self-determination64 and on specifically preserving a 
state’s right to refuse extradition for political offences during negotiation of the 
                                                 
61  Terrorist Bombing Convention art 11; Terrorism Financing Convention art 14; Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention art 15. 
62  The Terrorist Bombing Convention and Nuclear Terrorism Convention contain language which art 6 of 
the Terrorism Financing Convention does not: ‘in particular where they are intended or calculated to 
provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons’. Terrorist 
Bombing Convention art 5; Nuclear Terrorism Convention art 6. 
63  See, eg, Terrorist Bombing Convention art 5; Terrorism Financing Convention art 6; Nuclear Terrorism 
Convention art 5. While the language is new to the TSCs, it has long been part of the General Assembly’s 
discourse on international terrorism: see Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, 
GA Res 49/60, UN GAOR, 49th sess, 84th plen mtg, Agenda Item 142, Supp No 49, UN Doc 
A/RES/49/60 (9 December 1994) annex, art I(3); GA Establishment of Ad Hoc Committee of 51/210, UN 
Doc A/RES/51/210, para 2; GA Res 55/158, UN GAOR, 55th sess, 84th plen mtg, Agenda Item 164, Supp 
No 49, UN Doc A/RES/55/158 (12 December 2000) para 2; Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism, GA Res 57/27, UN GAOR, 57th sess, 52nd plen mtg, Agenda Item 160, Supp No 49, UN Doc 
A/RES/57/27 (19 November 2002) para 2; Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, GA Res 
58/81, UN GAOR, 58th sess, 72nd plen mtg, Agenda Item 156, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/58/81 (9 
December 2003) para 2; and has recently made its way into Security Council resolutions. The Security 
Council adopted language unequivocally condemning all acts of terrorism regardless or irrespective of 
their motivation in SC Res 1269, UN SCOR, 4053rd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1269 (19 October 1999) 
Preamble para 1; SC Res 1377, UN SCOR, 4413th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1377 (12 November 2001) annex, 
Preamble; SC Res 1456, UN SCOR, 4688th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1456 (20 January 2003) annex, 
Preamble. Later, the Security Council adopted the language of the GA resolutions verbatim by recalling 
that terrorist acts ‘are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature’ (emphasis added): see, eg, SC Res 1566, UN 
SCOR, 5053rd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1566 (8 October 2004) para 3. Since then, it has gone back to stating 
that ‘acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by 
whomsoever committed’: see, eg, SC Res 1617, UN SCOR, 5244th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1617 (29 July 
2005) Preamble; SC Res 2133, UN SCOR, 7101st mtg, UN Doc S/RES/2133 (27 January 2014) 
Preamble; SC Res 2249, UN SCOR, 7565th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/2249 (20 November 2015) Preamble. 
64  Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of December 1996, 
UN GAOR, 52nd sess, Supp No 37, UN Doc A/52/37 (31 March 1997) annex III, 38 (‘Proposal by 
Pakistan’, UN Doc A/AC.252/1997/WP.16, [10]) (‘1997 Report’). See also Report of the Working 
Group: Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 52nd sess, Agenda Item 
152, UN Doc A/C.6/52/L.3 (10 October 1997) annex II, 19 (‘Proposal Submitted by the Syrian Arab 
Republic’, UN Doc A/C.6/52/WG.1/CRP.4, [5]) (‘1997 Working Group Report’). After the fact, the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya noted its position that nothing in the Terrorist Bombing Convention could be 
interpreted as prejudicial to those who were struggling against foreign occupation: Summary Record, UN 
GAOR, 6th Comm, 52nd sess, 33rd mtg, Agenda Items 152 and 149, UN Doc A/C.6/52/SR.33 (2 December 
1997) 8 [69] (‘1997 Summary Record’). 
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Terrorist Bombing Convention.65 These proposals were simply not reflected in 
the final Convention – which was nevertheless adopted by consensus. 
The new language regarding the political offence exception was adopted with 
a view to ensuring there is no impunity for defined terrorist crimes. But the 
broader concerns underlying the development of the exception – namely that 
domestic prosecutions not be targeted selectively against a government’s political 
enemies – still remained. This concern, however, has been addressed in TSCs 
from the adoption of the Hostages Convention – which includes a proviso that 
the request for extradition shall not be granted if the requested state has 
substantial grounds for believing that the request was made for the purpose of 
prosecuting or punishing on account of race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or 
political opinion.66 The initial ICAO TSCs (the Hague Convention and Montreal 
Convention) and the SUA Convention (modelled very closely on the ICAO TSCs) 
did not contain this provision – negotiated as they were in specialised UN 
agencies and outside of the intensely political context of the UN (with its focus 
on the relationship between terrorism and self-determination). The 21st century 
Protocols which amend the ICAO TSCs and SUA Convention, however, do 
contain this provision67 – emphasising the premium placed on consistency within 
the terrorism suppression regime and the progressive iterations of obligations that 
are collateral to the core extradite or submit to prosecution obligation.  
This reactive sectoral approach has allowed for the evolution of international 
attitudes towards the scope of a state’s discretion in regard to the obligation to 
extradite or submit to prosecution to be reflected in treaty obligations. In 
particular, had a comprehensive terrorism suppression convention been adopted 
from the outset of the international community’s focus on non-state terrorism (in 
1970), it is unlikely that it would have denied states the right to refuse extradition 
on the basis of the political offence exception. While treaties can be interpreted in 
light of developments in international law, most particularly in reliance on article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT, the capacity to modernise treaties through interpretation is 
restricted in the face of clear language which preserves a state’s discretion (as do 
the TSCs adopted prior to the Terrorist Bombing Convention). Similarly, reliance 
on subsequent state practice in the application of a treaty68 would have been of 
little assistance in updating a comprehensive terrorism suppression convention to 
                                                 
65  1997 Report, UN Doc A/52/37, annex III, 40–1 (‘Proposal Submitted by France’, UN Doc 
A/AC.252/1997/WP.21). France’s proposal is surprising given that France submitted the initial draft of 
the Terrorist Bombing Convention on behalf of the Group of Seven major industrialised countries and the 
Russian Federation: see at annex II, 20–8 (‘Preliminary Working Document Submitted by France on 
Behalf of the Group of Seven Major Industrialized Countries on Behalf of the Russian Federation’, UN 
Doc A/AC.252/L.2), without any carve-out from the aut dedere aut judicare obligations for the political 
offence exception. 
66  Hostages Convention art 9(1); Terrorist Bombing Convention art 12; Terrorism Financing Convention art 
15; Nuclear Terrorism Convention art 16. This proviso tracks the language in art 3(b) of the Model Treaty 
on Extradition, GA Res 45/116, UN GAOR, 45th sess, 68th plen mtg, Agenda Item 100, Supp No 49, UN 
Doc A/RES/45/116 (14 December 1990) annex. 
67  SUA Convention art 11ter, as inserted by 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention art 10(3); Beijing 
Convention art 14; Hague Convention art 8ter, as inserted by 2010 Protocol to the Hague Convention art 
13. 
68  VLCT art 31(3)(b).  
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reflect the modern shift away from state discretion where such discretion 
undermines the increasingly pervasive ‘no impunity’ project. This is particularly 
the case because practice would be in the form of an omission (the absence of an 
invocation of the political offence exception as a basis for refusing extradition) 
and a state’s failure to act, on its own, might be considered insufficient to 
constitute evidence of opinio juris as to the existence of a prohibition.69 In other 
respects, however, treaty interpretation might well have been the vehicle for 
updating a comprehensive terrorism suppression convention adopted in 1970, 
limiting the extent to which the benefits of a sectoral approach – in its capacity to 
reinvent a core set of obligations over time in keeping with the development of 
international law – is worth the costs of such an approach (both in terms of the 
lack of comprehensive coverage and in terms of the coherence of the regime, as 
discussed further below). For instance the non-persecution obligations in regard 
to extradition, as an instantiation of customary international human rights law, 
could well have been read into a comprehensive convention in reliance on article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT. 
 
IV   COHERENCE OF THE TERRORISM SUPPRESSION 
REGIME? 
As discussed above, the benefit of a sectoral treaty regime is that it facilitates 
the progressive development of treaty obligations over time. The flipside of that 
benefit is, of course, measured in terms of the coherence of the regime. The 
overall aim of the terrorism suppression regime – to impose criminal liability for 
transnational terrorist crimes of concern to the international community – is met 
in varying degrees, depending on the nature of the terrorist conduct in question 
and the stage of international law development at the time of a particular TSC’s 
adoption. For instance, a state might refuse to extradite a non-state actor accused 
of hostage taking on the basis of the political offence exception (because a state’s 
discretion is not limited in this regard under the Hostages Convention), where it 
could not do so in regard to a terrorist bombing (because the Terrorist Bombing 
Convention prohibits invocation of the political offence exception as a basis for 
refusing extradition). 
This lack of coherence is also evident in regard to the regime interaction 
principles which the TSCs give effect to. The crimes addressed in some of the 
TSCs are crimes that non-state or state actors might engage in during armed 
conflicts (to which humanitarian law would also apply), and that state actors 
might engage in as a matter of the jus ad bellum. As a result of this overlap in 
potentially applicable legal regimes, the TSCs designate which regime of 
international law should apply to conduct which meets the elements of the 
terrorist offences defined therein but is carried out in different factual contexts. 
                                                 
69  The approach taken in SS ‘Lotus’ (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10, 19–21 was 
reaffirmed by the Court in its Kosovo Advisory Opinion: see Judge Simma’s critique of the majority 
opinion on this point: Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
in Respect of Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403, 478 [2] (Declaration of Judge Simma). 
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As each TSC was modelled on those adopted before it, but was responsive to the 
particular nature of the terrorist conduct being addressed and the international 
legal framework in existence at the time of negotiation, the TSCs reflect very 
different approaches to regime interaction.  
The approach of any particular TSC to regime interaction results in part from 
the different nature of the activities addressed – hostage-taking for instance is 
absolutely prohibited during armed conflict; whereas a particular bombing may 
or may not be prohibited under IHL (depending on the circumstances and nature 
of the target). That some conduct is absolutely prohibited in both armed conflicts 
and peacetime, while other conduct may be lawful during an armed conflict 
while it would nevertheless be an act of terrorism in peacetime, naturally affects 
the approach to regime interaction, as discussed further below. The differences in 
approach to regime interaction also result, however, from the focus of 
negotiations – ranging from a focus on no impunity (in respect of conduct that is 
absolutely prohibited whatever the factual context within which it occurs) to one 
whereby states seek to protect their own armed forces from potential 
prosecutions abroad (in respect of conduct that may or may not be lawful, calling 
for one state’s assessment of another’s international law compliance). As a result 
of these differences, the TSCs achieve the aim of imposing criminal liability for 
transnational terrorist crimes (whether carried out by NSAs or state actors)70 to 
varying degrees. Comparing the Hostages Convention with the Terrorist 
Bombing Convention serves to illustrate the issue.  
The Hostages Convention was the first of the TSCs to address regime 
interaction issues – in particular whether criminal responsibility should be 
imposed on NSAs exercising their right to self-determination. As discussed 
above, this debate was framed in terms of the definition of ‘hostage-taking’,71 but 
                                                 
70  It can be argued that the TSCs apply to state conduct (to the extent not excluded from the relevant TSC 
by a regime interaction clause, as discussed in this Part) on the basis of a Bosnia Genocide Case analysis: 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 43; see Trapp, ‘Holding States 
Responsible for Terrorism before the International Court of Justice’, above n 16. 
71  Several NAM delegates proposed that the definition of hostage-taking excludes ‘any acts carried out in 
the process of national liberation against colonial rule, racist and foreign regimes, by liberation 
movements recognized by the United Nations’: Hostages Records, UN Doc A/32/39, annex II, 111 
(‘Working Paper Submitted by Lesotho and the United Republic of Tanzania, Later Joined by Algeria, 
Egypt, Guinea, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Nigeria’, UN Doc A/AC.188/L.5). See also Tanzania’s 
comment: ‘The oppressed peoples and colonial peoples who were held in perpetual bondage could not be 
stopped from taking [their] oppressors hostage, if that became inevitable’: at annex I, 35–6 (‘8th Meeting’, 
UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.8 (10 August 1977) [28]–[29] (Tanzania)). See also at 30–1, 35–7 (‘8th Meeting’, 
UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.8 (10 August 1977) [1]–[6] (Algeria), [24] (Lesotho), [31] (Syrian Arab 
Republic)), 28 (‘7th Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.7 (9 August 1977) [12] (Yugoslavia)), 39 (‘9th 
Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.9 (11 August 1977) [10] (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)), 54 (11th Meeting’, 
UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.11 (12 August 1977) [16] (Lesotho)), 95 (‘17th Meeting’, UN Doc 
A/AC.188/SR.17 (17 August 1977) [21] (USSR)). Some states, however, understood well that the self-
determination question was one about regime interaction. In particular, Yemen stated that ‘either there 
would be an internationally accepted convention against the taking of hostages which did not apply to 
acts carried out by recognized national liberation movements in the course of their struggle, or there 
would be no convention at all’: at 83–4 (‘15th Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.15 (16 August 1977) [5] 
(Yemen)) (emphasis added). In characterising the question as one regarding the scope of application, 
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was in fact both in substance and in the compromise adopted about regime 
interaction. The position finally adopted in the Hostages Convention was 
intimately linked to the negotiated settlement of an IHL treaty only a few years 
earlier – in particular API. In extending the legal definition of international armed 
conflict (as set out in Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions) to 
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting in exercise of their right of self-
determination, 72  API imposes the full range of obligations applicable in 
international armed conflicts on freedom fighters (including the prohibition of 
taking hostages). 73  Indeed GCIV defines hostage-taking as a grave breach – 
resulting in the applicability of the criminal law enforcement obligations of the 
Geneva Conventions (including obligations to establish universal jurisdiction and 
extradite or prosecute) to such conduct.74 Were the Hostages Convention to carve 
out the conduct of those exercising their right of self-determination from the 
scope of the definition of ‘hostage-taking’ (or the scope of the Convention itself), 
it would have adopted a very different approach to the individual criminal 
responsibility of hostage takers to that reflected in API.75 Instead, it was accepted 
that hostage taking was a prohibited method under international law76 to which 
individual criminal responsibility should attach.  
As a result, the principal issue during negotiation became which criminal law 
enforcement regime (that of the Geneva Conventions and API, or that of 
                                                                                                                         
Yemen’s approach looks more like one about regime interaction (as discussed further below) than one 
about definition. 
72  The extension of the definition of international armed conflict in API art 1(4) is subject to a declaration 
by the authority representing a people: API art 96(3).  
73  API art 75(2)(c). The prohibition on taking protected persons (in particular civilians and combatants who 
are hors de combat but otherwise not protected by the first three Geneva Conventions) hostage is also set 
out in Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for 
signature 12 August 1949, 7 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950) art 34 (‘GCIV’).  
74  GCIV arts 146–7. 
75  Hostages Records, UN Doc A/32/39, annex I, 16 (‘3rd Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.3 (3 August 
1977) [25] (Germany)), 41–2 (‘9th Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.9 (11 August 1977) [24] (USA)), 
60–2 (‘12th Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.12 (12 August 1977) [4] (UK), [11] (USA)), 70 (‘13th 
Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.13 (15 August 1977) [9] (Germany)), 80–1 (‘14th Meeting’, UN Doc 
A/AC.188/SR.14 (15 August 1977) [43] (Mexico)); Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of 
an International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, UN GAOR, 33rd sess, Supp No 39, UN Doc 
A/33/39 (4 May 1978) annex, 68 (‘28th Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.28 (24 February 1978) [10] 
(Italy)) (‘Hostages Records 2’).  
76  As stated by the Chairman of one of the negotiating Ad Hoc Committee’s meetings:  
even the proponents of safeguards for the rights of national liberation movements had maintained that 
they were in no way suggesting that those movements should be granted an open licence to take hostages. 
However, it had been pointed out that a clear distinction should be drawn in the convention between 
genuine activities of national liberation movements and acts of terrorist groups which had nothing in 
common with them.  
  See Hostages Records 2, UN Doc A/33/39 annex, 58 (‘26th Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.26 (15 
February 1978) [3]). Similarly, Algeria clarified that it ‘had no intention of giving a blank cheque for 
hostage-taking to any group or entity whatever. As parties to international armed conflicts, national 
liberation movements were subject to the law of war, which in essence prohibited acts of hostage-taking’: 
see at 66 (‘28th Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.28 (24 February 1978) [4]); Hostages Records, UN Doc 
A/32/39, annex, 51–2 (‘11th Meeting’, UN Doc A/AC.188/SR.11 (12 August 1977) [5]–[6] (Mexico)). 
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terrorism suppression) should apply. Compromise on the self-determination issue 
therefore took the form of a regime interaction clause:  
In so far as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims or 
the Protocols Additional to those Conventions are applicable to a particular act of 
hostage-taking, and in so far as States Parties to this Convention are bound under 
those conventions to prosecute or hand over the hostage-taker, the present 
Convention shall not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of 
armed conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols 
thereto, including armed conflicts mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 4, of 
Additional Protocol I of 1977, in which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of 
their right of self-determination …77 
Article 12 of the Hostages Convention does not in any way exclude the 
criminal responsibility of hostage-takers engaged in a struggle for self-
determination; rather, the compromise shifts the source of the state’s obligation 
to prosecute or extradite such a person.78 To the extent that a state is under an 
obligation to prosecute or extradite a hostage-taker under the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions or API,79 they will not also have an obligation to do so under the 
Hostages Convention. To the extent that IHL does not impose an aut dedere aut 
judicare obligation in respect of a particular hostage-taking (most likely because 
the hostage-taking is committed during the course of a non-international armed 
conflict to which the grave breaches regime does not apply, or during a struggle 
for self-determination in a state which is not party to API), the Hostages 
Convention will be the source of the aut dedere aut judicare obligation. As such, 
no instance of hostage-taking is exempt from the obligation to extradite or 
prosecute. This regime interaction clause, premised on the absolute nature of the 
prohibition and conceptions of the appropriate regime for criminal responsibility, 
is in keeping with a terrorism suppression regime defined in terms of ‘no 
impunity’. 
                                                 
77  Hostages Convention art 12 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). For a further discussion of art 12 of the 
Hostages Convention, see Wil D Verwey, ‘The International Hostages Convention and National 
Liberation Movements’ (1981) 75 American Journal of International Law 69, 76. 
78  Some commentators have nevertheless interpreted art 12 of the Hostages Convention as legitimising 
hostage-takings committed in furtherance of a struggle for self-determination: see Grant Wardlaw, 
Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics, and Counter-Measures (Cambridge University Press, 1982); Clive 
C Aston, ‘The United Nations Convention against the Taking of Hostages: Realistic or Rhetoric?’ (1982) 
5 Terrorism 139, 156. 
79  The obligation to prosecute or extradite persons accused of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions 
can be found in: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 
October 1950) arts 49–50; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 
(entered into force 21 October 1950) art 50; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950) art 129; 
GCIV art 146 (together with the other treaties in this note, the ‘1949 Geneva Conventions’). The extradite 
or prosecute obligation will only apply to hostage-takings committed by NSAs in the course of an armed 
conflict involving a struggle for self-determination to the extent that the state party to the armed conflict 
is a party to API (and the resulting legal re-characterisation of the non-international self-determination 
armed conflict into an international armed conflict under API to which the 1949 Geneva Conventions then 
apply: API art 1(4)). 
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Subsequent TSC regime interaction clauses, however, were less focused on 
the ‘no impunity’ project and the appropriate regime for the imposition of 
criminal responsibility for unlawful conduct, and more focused on states’ efforts 
to ensure that their own armed forces were not caught up in the terrorism 
suppression framework of criminal law enforcement. In particular, the Terrorist 
Bombing Convention, addressing as it does actus reus elements that a state’s 
military forces might engage in, reflects an entirely different negotiated 
settlement on regime interaction.  
As with all of the TSCs, and indeed the comprehensive terrorism suppression 
convention, 80  there were of course proposals to exclude acts committed in 
furtherance of a people’s right of self-determination from the scope of the 
Terrorist Bombing Convention.81 The principal focus of negotiation, however, 
was on the conduct of a state’s military forces.82 NAM states generally held the 
view that only the activities of a state’s armed forces carried out in compliance 
with international law should be excluded from the scope of the Terrorist 
Bombing Convention,83 the result of which would have been that all state military 
activity within the scope of the Convention in breach of IHL would also fall 
within the scope of the terrorism suppression regime. Any state party to the 
Terrorist Bombing Convention could therefore exercise universal jurisdiction in 
respect of members of the armed forces of another state where there were 
credible allegations that they had detonated a bomb in breach of IHL obligations. 
There was much resistance to this proposal by Western states, who exerted a 
great deal of pressure during the negotiations, not least because it was being 
negotiated in a crisis context of increasingly serious transnational bombings 
carried out by NSAs. Ultimately the urgency of the need to address terrorist 
bombings84 resulted in the Terrorist Bombing Convention being adopted without 
reflecting either the self-determination or the ‘lawful State conduct’ exclusion 
proposals. The Terrorist Bombing Convention does however exclude the 
activities of armed forces during an armed conflict (as such terms are understood 
                                                 
80  For a discussion of comprehensive terrorism suppression conventions, see above nn 47–8 and 
accompanying text. 
81  1997 Working Group Report, UN Doc A/C.6/52/L.3, annex II, 19 (‘Proposal Submitted by the Syrian 
Arab Republic’, UN Doc A/C.6/52/WG.1/CRP.4, [5(b)]), 31 (‘Proposal Submitted by Egypt’, UN Doc 
A/C.6/52/WG.1/CRP.28).  
82  1997 Report, UN Doc A/52/37, annex IV, 53–5 [38]–[56]. 
83  Ibid annex IV, 53 [44]. See, eg, 1997 Summary Record, UN Doc A/C.6/52/SR.33, 5 [45] (Pakistan), 6 
[52] (Iran), 6 [54] (Iraq), 8 [70] (Libya), 8 [74] (Lebanon). See also 1997 Working Group Report, UN 
Doc A/C.6/52/L.3, annex II, 19 (‘Proposal Submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic’, UN Doc 
A/C.6/52/WG.1/CRP.4, [5]). 
84  See, eg, 1997 Report, UN Doc A/52/37, annex II, 22 (‘Preliminary Working Document Submitted by 
France on Behalf of the Group of Seven Major Industrialized Countries and the Russian Federation’, UN 
Doc A/AC.252/L.2, annex, art 3), annex III, 33–4 (‘Revised Proposal Submitted on Behalf of the Group 
of Seven Major Industrialized Countries and the Russian Federation’, UN Doc A/AC.252/1997/WP.12); 
1997 Summary Record, UN Doc A/C.6/52/SR.33, 2 [4] (Australia), 3 [16] (Italy), 3 [17] (Czech 
Republic), 3 [18] (USA), 3–4 [23] (Finland). 
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in IHL85) from the scope of the Convention. The exclusion clause in article of the 
19(2) of the Terrorist Bombing Convention, reads as follows:  
The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are 
understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, 
are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by military 
forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are 
governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention.  
The exclusion is not conditioned on the applicability of an alternative 
criminal law enforcement regime. As a result, the mere existence of international 
law touching on the conduct (even if the applicable rules designate the conduct as 
unlawful, but do not impose any criminal law enforcement obligations with 
respect thereto) is sufficient to exclude it from the scope of the Terrorist 
Bombing Convention. And as long as the bombing is carried out in the context of 
(and connected to) an international or non-international armed conflict, there will 
indeed be international law touching on the conduct.  
Bombings which are in compliance with IHL86 are excluded from the scope 
of the Terrorist Bombing Convention, and will not be subject to any aut dedere 
aut judicare obligation (under the Terrorist Bombing Convention because of the 
exclusion, and under IHL because of its compliance) – and this is exactly as it 
should be. If international law is to preserve the integrity of IHL and its balance 
between military necessity and considerations of humanity, the negotiated 
settlement of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and API should not be reopened 
under the guise of terrorism suppression. Had there been no Article 19 exclusion 
from the scope of the Terrorist Bombing Convention, it would have imposed 
obligations on states parties which are inconsistent with their obligation to 
respect combatant’s immunity vis-à-vis state armed forces in international armed 
conflicts, or would potentially disincentivise organised armed forces of NSAs 
from complying with IHL.87 
However, bombings which are in breach of IHL, carried out by an organised 
armed group of NSAs or a state’s armed forces in the course of a non-
international armed conflict, are not subject to an aut dedere aut judicare 
obligation under IHL. Nor are bombings in breach of IHL carried out by a people 
fighting in exercise of its right of self-determination (unless the territorial state 
                                                 
85  While art 12 of the Hostages Convention defines its terms in reference to the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocols, the Terrorist Bombing Convention defines ‘armed conflict’ and ‘armed forces’ in 
reference to IHL generally, and thereby incorporates by reference (for definitional purposes) customary 
international humanitarian law as well. 
86  For instance, if the bombing is justified by military necessity (GCIV art 53), or only targets objects which 
make an effective contribution to military action (API arts 52, 85(3)(a)) or any incidental loss of civilian 
life or damage to civilian objects is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated from the bombing (API arts 50, 52, 57(2)(iii), 85(3)(b)–(c)), it is not in breach of IHL, is 
therefore (obviously) not a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or API, and is not subject to an 
extradite or prosecute obligation.  
87  See Kimberley N Trapp, ‘R v Mohammed Gul: Are You a Terrorist if You Support the Syrian 
Insurgency?’ on EJIL: Talk! (14 March 2012) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/r-v-mohammed-gul-are-you-a-
terrorist-if-you-support-the-syrian-insurgency/>. 
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has ratified API),88 and most bombings in breach of IHL carried out by states that 
are not party to API.89 As a result, in cases where IHL targeting obligations are 
                                                 
88  The grave breaches regime of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and API (imposing an aut dedere aut 
judicare obligation on states in respect of conduct defined as a grave breach of those conventions) only 
applies to international armed conflicts. There is no grave breaches regime in respect of breaches to 
common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (the only provision to apply to non-international 
armed conflicts) or the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature 8 
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 (entered into force 7 December 1978). Finally, a conflict of self-
determination, in which a people is fighting against a government, is a non-international armed conflict 
unless the state in whose territory the conflict is being fought has ratified API (and the representative of 
the people has made an art 96 API declaration). While there is increasing evidence that states claim a 
right to prosecute breaches of IHL committed during non-international armed conflicts (see Thomas 
Graditzky, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in Non-international Armed Conflicts’ (1998) 38 International Review of the Red Cross 29; 
Jugement en la cause Fulgence Niyonteze, Tribunal Militaire de Division 2, Armée Suisse Justice 
Militaire (Lausanne, 30 April 1999); The Four from Butare Case, Court of Cassation (Belgium, 9 January 
2002)), there is as of yet no customary international law obligation to prosecute breaches of IHL 
committed in the context of non-international armed conflicts on the basis of universal jurisdiction: see 
Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) 
(International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-A, 2 October 1995) 
[80]; Liesbeth Zegfeld, Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 175; Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) 235; Lindsay Moir, ‘Grave Breaches and Internal Armed Conflicts’ (2009) 7 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 763. In relation to the inexistence of such a customary obligation for 
international crimes more generally, see Report of the International Law Commission: Sixty-Sixth Session 
(5 May – 6 June and 7 July – 8 August 2014), UN GAOR, 69th sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/69/10 
(2014) 160–1; Summary Record, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 62nd sess, 22nd mtg, Agenda Item 82, UN Doc 
A/C.6/62/SR.22 (4 December 2007) 11 [55] (Austria), 11 [58] (Argentina), 16 [82] (Germany); Summary 
Record, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 62nd sess, 23rd mtg, Agenda Item 82, UN Doc A/C.6/62/SR.23 (6 
December 2007) 3 [14] (Malaysia); Summary Record, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 62nd sess, 24th mtg, Agenda 
Item 82, UN Doc A/C.6/62/SR.24 (13 December 2007) 7 [35] (Greece), 11 [63] (UK), 14 [82]–[84] 
(Russian Federation); Summary Record, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 64th sess, 22nd mtg, Agenda Items 81 and 
79, UN Doc A/C.6/64/SR.22 (8 February 2010) 15 [85] (Thailand); Summary Record, UN GAOR, 6th 
Comm, 64th sess, 23rd mtg, Agenda Item 81, UN Doc A/C.6/64/SR.23 (18 December 2009) 9 [50] (USA); 
Zdzislaw Galicki, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission, The Obligation to Extradite or 
Prosecute (Aut Dedere Aut Judicare): Second Report on the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute, 59th 
sess, Agenda Item 6, UN Docs A/CN.4/585 and Corr.1 (11 June 2007) 74 [54]. Both empirical and policy 
reasons can be identified for this. Not only is there insufficient state practice, but states are also concerned 
that their sovereign discretion in matters of extradition and extraterritorial jurisdiction would be limited in 
an undesirable manner should such an obligation apply to purely domestic situations: see Raphaël van 
Steenberghe, ‘The Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute: Clarifying Its Nature’ (2011) 9 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 1089, 1103. 
89  Most of the regulation of methods and means of warfare – which would define the lawfulness of a 
particular bombing – are found in API (and not the Geneva Conventions). But the grave breaches criminal 
law enforcement obligations of API are not binding as a matter of customary international law, even if the 
substantive obligations (which would apply to bombings) are. See Claire Mitchell, Aut Dedere, Aut 
Judicare: The Extradite or Prosecute Clause in International Law (Graduate Institute, 2009) ch 1; Jean-
Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol 1, 25–8 (rule 7), 37–40 (rule 
11), 58–60 (rule 18); Jean-François Quéguiner, ‘Precautions under the Law Governing the Conduct of 
Hostilities’ (2006) 88 International Review of the Red Cross 793. The one exception is in reference to a 
bombing by state armed forces which results in ‘extensive destruction … of property [protected by 
GCIV], not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’ – which will be 
subject to an aut dedere aut judicare obligation under art 147 of GCIV. As the Geneva Conventions are 
 
1216 UNSW Law Journal Volume 39(3) 
breached (which breach is co-extensive with the definition of a terrorist bombing 
under the Terrorism Bombing Convention), there will be no IHL criminal law 
enforcement obligations applicable thereto when that breach is committed by the 
armed forces of a non-party state to API or by a people in a non-party state to 
API. As any such bombings are nevertheless ‘governed by’ IHL, therefore falling 
outside the scope of the Terrorist Bombing Convention, they would not be 
subject to any aut dedere aut judicare obligation. In effect, the focus on the 
conduct of a state’s armed forces in the negotiation of the Terrorist Bombing 
Convention exclusion clause has created gaps in the criminal law enforcement 
framework as it applies to international law breaching bombings.90 There are 
potentially very good reasons for this – for instance leaving these matters to be 
addressed within the more specialised IHL regime, and that it should perhaps not 
be for the terrorism suppression regime to ‘fix’ or ‘plug holes’ in another 
regime’s criminal law enforcement framework. Even so, the result is potentially 
one of impunity, and is certainly at odds with the approach taken under the 
Hostages Convention – which ensured that defined (unlawful and criminal) 
conduct was always subject to a criminal law enforcement regime, even if that 
regime was one related to terrorism suppression where the conduct was also 
governed by IHL.91  
 
V   CONCLUSION 
The modern story of terrorism suppression is one written by the conduct of 
NSAs. But the sub-plots of this story are about interaction – interaction between 
the rights of NSAs to self-determination and the criminal responsibility of NSAs 
for conduct that affects civilians; the interaction between a treaty regime focused 
on an end to impunity and states’ efforts to exempt their own armed forces from 
foreign criminal law enforcement; the interaction between the general and the 
specific. The reactive nature of the TSCs and the results of these interactions 
have created a terrorism suppression regime which cannot respond to 
‘evolutions’ in terrorist violence in advance, but which can respond to the 
evolution of international law – although perhaps at the price of a certain degree 
of coherence. 
                                                                                                                         
universally ratified, such unlawful bombings in the context of an international armed conflict will always 
be subject to a criminal law enforcement regime. 
90  There is no gap in respect of unlawful bombings carried out by the armed forces of a state party to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and API participating in an international armed conflict. While their conduct is 
excluded from the scope of the Terrorist Bombing Convention, it will be subject to an alternative aut 
dedere aut judicare obligation to the extent that the bombing amounts to a grave breach of IHL treaties. 
91  Several states have expressly recognised that ‘[t]ogether with the principle of universal jurisdiction, the 
obligation to extradite or prosecute served to ensure that there would be no safe haven for the perpetrators 
of international crimes’: Summary Record, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 66th sess, 26th mtg, Agenda Items 81 
and 143, UN Doc A/C.6/66/SR.26 (7 December 2011) 4 [10] (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden). See also at 5 [18] (Switzerland), 6 [24] (El Salvador), 9 [42] (Italy), 13 [64] (Peru). See also 
Summary Record, UN GAOR, 6th Comm, 66th sess, 27th mtg, Agenda Items 81, 143, 78 and 82, UN Doc 
A/C.6/66/SR.27 (8 December 2011) 9 [64] (Russian Federation), 12 [81] (India). 
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And therein lies the potentialities and limitations of reactive law making in 
the terrorism context. In terms of limitations, the international community’s 
continuing failure to address terrorism in a comprehensive convention creates 
real dangers, both in terms of the ‘no-impunity’ project and in terms of 
prevention. As regards the ‘no-impunity’ project, the TSCs are essential if 
transnational terrorists are to be brought to justice, not least because of the 
absence of criminal law enforcement obligations in respect of terrorism at 
customary international law and current international law limitations on the 
exercise of jurisdiction over crimes with which the prosecuting state has no 
connection. In default of a treaty obligation to establish universal jurisdiction 
over acts of terrorism and to extradite or prosecute, transnational terrorism would 
be (for the most part) un-prosecutable. Acts of terrorism which are not (or not 
yet) addressed within the terrorism suppression regime are therefore likely to go 
unpunished. As regards prevention, the terrorism suppression regime (and the 
Security Council resolutions which have emerged out of it) create a focal point 
for international co-operation. And a focus on particular manifestations of 
terrorism in the prevention sphere very naturally risks a lack of attention to 
others. 
Equally, the focus on particular manifestations of terrorism potentially invites 
an unprincipled approach to regime interaction. Is the terrorism suppression 
regime about ensuring that there is no impunity for conduct that is criminal and 
unlawful under international law (in particular conduct which affects civilians92), 
or is the terrorism suppression regime a vehicle for criminalising our enemy’s 
conduct while protecting our own from prosecution? And should the answer to 
that question depend on whether the relevant act ‘merely’ deprives a civilian of 
her liberty, or whether the conduct deprives her of her life (through the use of a 
bomb or a nuclear device for instance)? 
But in terms of potentialities, the sectoral approach to terrorism suppression 
has given treaty expression to significant developments in international law, in 
particular as regards international law on jurisdiction, international human rights 
law and international criminal law. Some of these developments, for instance the 
availability of universal jurisdiction and the political offence exception, would 
not easily be interpreted into existing treaties through systemic interpretation. 
Reactive law making, which in the terrorism context also involves law making 
over time, has provided an opportunity to fine tune the terrorism suppression 
regime so that it is in keeping with at least some of the values underlying the 
modern international legal system. 
A comprehensive terrorism suppression convention, long under negotiation, 
could be the best of both worlds – benefitting from its parentage and the 
incremental development of international law collateral to the core criminal law 
                                                 
92  The only general definition of terrorism in the TSCs defines terrorism as an act  
intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active 
part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or 
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or 
to abstain from doing any act. 
  Terrorism Financing Convention art 2(1)(b). 
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enforcement obligations, while capturing terrorist conduct whatever its future and 
as yet unanticipated incarnations. This author’s concern, however, is that the sub-
plots of terrorism suppression, in particular as regards the interactions between 
the terrorism regime, self-determination, and the responsibilities of state actors 
under the jus in bello, have their role to play in the comprehensive story as well. 
And given that catalysing terrorist events can always be responded to through the 
sectoral approach, it is far from clear where the political will to compromise on 
these interactions for the sake of a comprehensive approach will come from. 
 
 
 
 
